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Letters Gabriel Dessus

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        Letters from Gabriel Dessus
of the 3 October 1936 and 27 March 1938

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Letters from Gabriel Dessus written from France to my parents in Argentina during the troubled pre-war eras. They had sent their 2 eldest children (born in 21 and 22) , François and Michel continued their studies in Paris , hosted by their grandmothers.

        These letters clearly show the clarity of "ton Gaby" and his ability to analyze complex situations and draw conclusions that, after all, seem to be common sense.

              "Saturday 3.X. (1936, popular front in France with general strikes organized by the communists, beginning of the Spanish war against the Spanish Communists)

        My dear Jean - We went before last night Mom  (Granny Cordelle) And I'm at Mrs. Hausermann's. (my other grandmother) to discuss the question posed by your letter. You will have two more accounts of our interview – which will allow you to reconstruct the atmosphere.

       There is a clear first point on which we are all absolutely agreed: if after reading our letters and thinking about the various hypotheses, you have any doubt and concern about the safety of your children, then you can only make a final decision, and neither of us will be able to take responsibility for ensuring the future under the present conditions.

      It is very difficult for us to make a sound opinion for ourselves; I give you the elements as I see them below.

      There has been no drop of blood in France so far; if we look back to the prewar eras (Draveil's strikes, railway strikes, etc., disturbances in wine-growing regions, mutinies of troops, etc.), we will consider the current period as free from unrest; only the total absence of strikes and social conflicts that marked the crisis of recent years gives prominence to the current conflicts.

     In the opposite direction, it should be noted that the action of the Communist Party has developed fairly widely under the cover of the popular front; it is not doubtful that a large number of sheep and people who want to be on the side of the next round have evolved in this direction.

     The Communist Party has done everything it can to facilitate this development; it has multiplied the reassuring statements, since Thorez's intervention in June, to declare that it is necessary to stop a strike until the annexation of the most militant patriotism, passing through the proposals of the "French front" and the advances made to Catholics. And it does not seem necessary to hide that on the day when they believe they can take power, the Communists would not retreat from the choice of means; I do not know what to think of J. Bardoux's revelations in the Paris Review on the planned communist coup d'état in June, and the information that Gringoire gives periodically on the plans of the Third International with regard to France; but I doubt that any confidence should be given to Thorez's reassuring statements and others;

     In the face of this, there are a few but very "inflated" Roque troops (which are still serving and will continue to serve to maintain the cohesion of the popular front).The Doriot party seems to have been successful – and the fact that the country's general opinion is not communist (which is expressed by the resistance of the Senate, etc.; but it must be admitted that the general views have always been violated by the active minorities).

      If the question of force were to be reached, there would have to be some weapons on both sides (there have certainly been arms distributions for some time), but all this would not weigh on the means available to the police and the army. However, while it can be admitted that the Parisian police have some "popular front" sympathies, there is nothing to suggest that they are ready for a communist coup; and if we can admit that Pierre Cot  (the Minister of the Air of the Popular Front) There is no way Daladier's sympathies could be said, and there is no way that the army would follow his leaders.

      Finally, it seems to me that the vast majority of French people understand that a civil war is in itself an atrocious thing (Spain's experience) and that under the current conditions of Europe it would be immediate foreign war – something that should not be overlooked in your plans; the risk of war may be, at one year's notice, higher than the risk of revolution.

     Personally, I believe that internal disturbances up to the partial riot are possible; but I do not believe in generalisation.

     Now we must measure what children, living in Passy's home and not going to political meetings, risk in there. They seem to me to have a very low chance of being "in the blow." (except for foreign war with bombing of Paris) and we must remember that Commune 71 has certainly killed far fewer people than an epidemic of influenza – and by far.

     Moreover, it would be possible to send them to Vierville, assuming that they could be sent in time; Normandy is remarkably "fascist" and Madame Hausermann must have given you some details about the adventure of the sub-prefect of Bayeux and the attitude of your farmers. (see letters from Nany to Jean Hausermann)

    I suggest a solution: if you didn't have an absolute objection to boarding school, you could look for a college of the open air – like Les Roches or others – where the children could continue their French studies, apparently sheltered from almost all the risks – all the risks I was talking about above seem essentially Parisian to me - I don't know anything about the possible colleges, but I think if you were considering this, we could find out, go and see in the car and find it quickly enough. In the same vein, one could envisage a Geneva institute or elsewhere in Switzerland – but that would seem to me both too far and too little – too far from French studies, and too far from France.

     These are the elements of reflection I can give you; I hope I have not underestimated the risks; but I do not think I can conceal that the general atmosphere does not reflect at all the concern that your letters showed.

     Don't hesitate to ask us for information or research in the direction I suggest or in any other direction; I understand too well where you are so far away to be at your disposal.

     The best solution was found by François.. they only have to come back!. . . It is the grace I wish you –
    I'm both lovingly kissing you.
               Gabriel Dessus

(Finally, my parents quickly decided not to bring François and Michel back to Argentina, nor to put them in boarding school)

                 The same question was raised in March 1938, with Hitler's annexation of Austria and the increasing threats that he had posed to peace since his coming to power in 1933. Indeed, if there were any doubt in 1936, most observers in 1938 thought the war was almost inevitable. The Munich Accords in autumn 1938, devoking the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, were unexpected, but of short duration, less than a year after the real war broke out in August 1939.

                 Whatever the case, here is Gabriel Dessus's opinion on March 27, 1938:

                                                             " Sunday 27.III
                    My dear Jean.

          I owed you a letter for the day of the year, which I never wrote - because I am awfully lazy to write and because you do not doubt the wishes we make for you – for your health – and for your return - but I think that at present I owe you a letter to try to develop – as much as, privately, we can – the situation in France - I will not learn anything about external affairs, l-Anschluss (annexation of Austria), Czechoslovakia. It is a bit dismaying to think that the same Austrians who would have given 75% of the votes to Schussnigg will give 80% to Hitler.. and the contagion of this kind of enthusiasm is obviously very much to fear. The only antidote of all this is in the excess of what Hitler has to demand from everyone; and it is hardly of European power to which he did not take up a piece of territory, this being perfectly explained in Mein Kampf. This obviously leads to a certain amount of unanimity against him – the whole question being the extent of the damage he will have time to do for a while – and the means that will remain available after – it is generally thought here that if he is not crazy, he will ask Prague for hard enough things to swallow, but not enough to raise France and England – and that he will leave it to the time to finish the work of the annexation of the Sudetes. This would obviously be a big failure in perspective for France, but not the war tomorrow.

        On this last point, it would not be extremely well placed: there is obviously the delay of armament from England, but there is also the fact that he has just been in the middle of his general staff, the fact that by going so quickly he would put against him the hesitants – the fact that Japan is engaged in China and can't do anything against Russia for now – the fact that Italy is very committed everywhere (and should not be predicted the defection always possible?). So it seems that except madness he will act differently. Later.. we will see.

        The internal situation in France is more difficult to unravel. Everyone speaks of national union, but it covers very different ideas.

        The rightwing parties think that this means muzzling the workers' movement, demolishing the "popu front", reassure the possessors, by obtaining from Blum (socialist party, allied with the communists and radicals of Daladier and Reynaud) an even clearer volte face than Macdonald's during the formation of the British national ministry - Blum and his team see there the way to give themselves at the expense of the radicals líllure of a large government party, to apply their ideas in a way certainly much more conservative than it was intended the first time (they were very much laid down, and the most Blum in the lead, understood a lot of things – but not to lose their clientele to the benefit of communist opposition, they must compromise them by bringing them into government – and that is the difficult point, for the Communists will not let themselves be taken away without serious counterpart, or without ideas behind their heads.  (in fact, they will refuse to participate)  The strikes at Citroen these days have no other meaning, I think: the Communist Party wants to show that it will not be easily done.

        Assuming – which I think is likely at least for the moment – that the PC is entirely in Moscow's hands, it does not have an interest in pushing things into drama and permanently weakening Russia's only serious ally; but it has a better chance of blackmailing the socialists, and of blackmailing the trade union over production – to get as much benefit as possible from the situation.

        As far as workers are concerned, there is certainly a considerable cooling of the "popu front" of 1936; but it should not be imagined that right-wing parties would allow workers to touch social laws, paid holidays etc. and, above all, would give up having a serious influence on the government; nor that the CGT, which has certainly lost much of its influence, would see its members permanently detach itself. Activist unionism is (except in metallurgical and building) put a little into sleep and the big themes do not really turn the masses on, but if we started a reflex of "class defense" people would be instantly behind the CGT.

       On the other hand, if Parliament is obviously rather deformed, there is no real disaffection from the regime and above all there is nothing to replace it, which has a real audience in the country; neither FSP nor WP – etc. – (The story of the hoods did a lot of harm).

       As in the case of general elections, it will be necessary to find a parliamentary solution. It would be better if this were not too long-suffering! – but instead of Lebrun  (the President of the Republic, appointed as Chairman of the Council)  Even a ministry of "technical" is very difficult to put up - there are few men who are not in one way or another marked from the political point of view - and going to pick up Marshal Pétain is not a solution in itself.

       In any case, from the point of view of safety of the children who are obviously concerned, I do not think that an internal movement is in the possibilities to be envisaged; in case of threatening external complications they leave in Vierville, on foot if necessary to begin (because essential is to be 15 or 20 km from Paris – after that one can see). (Granny Cordelle)  to whom I have spoken took all reasonable precautions – which I am looking forward to saying should not make you believe that we thought it likely that Mr. Goering's planes would arrive tomorrow morning, on the contrary! -

       I think we'll see each other in Paris before that, before Mr. Maurice Thorez "son of the people" has taken power, etc.  (they came back 15 months later)  Well affectionate.

                                     Gabriel Dessus

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